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NOTES
LAKE v. ARNOLD: THE DISABLED AND THE
CONFUSED JURISPRUDENCE
OF 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)
In 1871, as the Ku Klux Klan terrorized the Reconstruction South, the
Forty-Second Congress responded by enacting the Ku Klux Klan Act.'
One of the many pieces of civil rights legislation enacted by the Recon-
struction-era Congresses 2 was section two of the Ku Klux Klan Act
which sought to curb the Klan's activities in the South.3 The Act created
a federal civil cause of action against individuals who conspire to de-
prive any person, or class of persons, "equal protection of the laws" or
"equal privileges and immunities under the laws."' Shortly after enact-
1. Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, ch. 22, § 2, 17 Stat. 13 (1871) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1994)).
2. Such legislation includes: Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (prohib-
iting Southern Black Codes); Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 14, 16 Stat. 140 (securing
voting rights); Act of Feb. 28, 1871, ch. 99, 16 Stat. 433 (securing voting rights);
Act of Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (the Ku Klux Klan Act); Act of Mar. 1,
1875, ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335 (prohibiting racial discrimination in public accommo-
dations). See Note, The Class-Based Animus Requirement of 42 US.C. § 1985(c):
A Suggested Approach, 64 MINN. L. REV. 635, 635 n.2 (1980) [hereinafter Class-
Based Animus].
3. See CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., 317 (remarks of Rep. Shellabar-
ger); see also Eugene Gressman, The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation,
50 MICH. L. REV. 1323, 1334 (1952) (when this Comment was originally pub-
lished, § 1985(3) was codified at 8 U.S.C. § 47(3) (1946) and 42 U.S.C. § 1983
was codified at 8 U.S.C. § 43 (1946)); Ken Gormley, Private Conspiracies and the
Constitution: A Modern Vision of 42 U.S.C. Section 1985(3), 64 TEX. L. REV. 527,
530-31 (1985); Janis L. McDonald, Starting from Scratch: A Revisionist View of
42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) and Class-Based Animus, 19 CONN. L. REV. 471,477 (1987).
4. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1994). Section two of the Ku Klux Klan Act pro-
vides in relevant part:
If two or more persons . . . conspire or go in disguise on the high-
way or on the premises of another, for the purpose of depriving, ei-
ther directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the
equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities
under the laws ... in any case of conspiracy set forth in this section,
if one or more persons engaged therein do, or cause to be done, any
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ment, section two of the Ku Klux Klan Act was essentially rendered
moot by a series of Supreme Court decisions5 that attempted to limit the
effectiveness of all Reconstruction civil rights legislation, including the
newly ratified Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments. 6 The
lack of actions brought under the Ku Klux Klan Act, now codified at 42
U.S.C. § 1985(3), indicates the initial success of these hostile Supreme
Court decisions. No cases involving § 1985(3) were reported for the first
forty-nine years of the statute's existence.7
The Supreme Court did not adjudicate a § 1985(3) case until 1951,
when it decided Collins v. Hardyman.8 In Collins, the Court held that for
Congress' constitutional power to reach a conspiracy under § 1985(3),
there must be "some manipulation of the law or its agencies." 9 This
act in furtherance of the object of such conspiracy whereby another
is injured in his person or property, or deprived ot having and exer-
cising any right or privilege- of a citizen of the United States, the
party so injured or deprived may have an action for the recovery of
damages ... against any one or more of the conspirators.
42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1994).
The civil component of section two of the Act was first codified as Rev. Stat. §
1980(3). It later appeared at 8 U.S.C. § 47(3) and 42 U.S.C. § 1985(c). This Note
will refer to the statute by its current citation.
5. See The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873) (limiting the
protection of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments to the "one
pervading purpose found in them all ... the freedom of the slave race."); United
States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876) (holding that the first section of the
Fourteenth Amendment governs only the states and does not "add anything to the
rights which one citizen has under the Constitution against another"); United States
v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629 (1883) (holding the criminal counterpart to § 1985(3) un-
constitutional since none of the newly ratified amendments gave Congress power to
reach private, non-state action); The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) (holding
the Civil Rights Act of 1875, which prohibited various private acts of racial dis-
crimination, unconstitutional).
6. See generally Gressman, supra note 3, at 1336-43; Gormley, supra note 3,
at 541-46.
7. See Comment, The Civil Rights Act: Emergence of an Adequate Federal
Civil Remedy, 26 IND. L.J. 361, 363 (1951) (when this Comment was originally
published, § 1985(3) was codified at 8 U.S.C. § 47(3) (1946)).
8. 341 U.S. 651 (1951).
9. Id at 661. The rationale for this state action requirement rested on the
premise that only states, not individuals may deprive individuals of their constitu-
tional rights.
[As] fully developed in the Civil Rights Cases, that an individual or
group of individuals not in office cannot deprive anybody of con-
stitutional rights, though they may invade or violate those rights, it
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limitation not only discouraged § 1985(3) claims, but also caused its
coverage to overlap the protection provided by other civil rights legisla-
tion codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1983.'0 Section 1985(3) was revitalized
twenty years later in Griffin v. Breckenridge,"l where the Court abol-
ished the state action requirement of Collins, reasoning that "many of
the constitutional problems there perceived [in Collins] simply do not
exist."' 12 By opening the way for purely private 3 conspiracies to recover
under § 1985(3), Griffin accorded the "words of the statute their appar-
ent meaning.' 14 However, the Court in Griffin added an element to §
1985(3) jurisprudence which has caused conflicting decisions and end-
less confusion, 5 namely the class-based, invidiously discriminatory
animus.
Concerned with the constitutional problems with § 1985(3) being "a
general federal tort law," the Court held that "there must be some racial,
is clear that this statute does not attempt to reach a conspiracy to
deprive one of rights, unless it is a deprivation of equality, of 'equal
protection of the law' or of 'equal privileges and immunities under
the law.'
Id.
10. See Gressman, supra note 3, at 1356. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides that
[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regula-
tion, custom, or usage of any State or Territory or the District of
Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an ac-
tion at law.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
11. 403 U.S. 88 (1971).
12. Id. at 96.
13. This Note uses the word "private" to indicate the complete lack of state
involvement or state action.
14. Griffin, 403 U.S. at 96.
15. The issue has also offered scholars and judges opportunities to showcase
their wits by crafting pithy remarks on the resulting confusion. See, e.g., Gormley,
supra note 3, at 550-52. "[Griffin] creat[ed] a jumble of uncertain rules and un-
steady boundary lines." Id "The best that can be said of § 1985(3) jurisprudence
thus far is that it has been marred by fits and starts, plagued by inconsistencies, and
left in flux by the Supreme Court." Trautz v. Weisman, 819 F. Supp. 282, 291
(S.D.N.Y. 1993). "Changing interpretation has been the only constant about
§ 1985(3)." Stevens v. Tillman, 855 F.2d 394, 405 (7th Cir. 1988). "Even after
one hundred and sixteen years, four major Supreme Court opinions, colorful legis-
lative history, and over five hundred lower court opinions, there is probably no
other federal statute in such complete disarray, distortion, and confusion as . ..
§ 1985(3)." McDonald, supra note 3, at 471.
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or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus
behind the conspirators' action.' 6 The Griffin Court's short, curt con-
sideration of the class-based animus issue and a general lack of clear
instruction in subsequent decisions, 17 have resulted in disagreement
among the lower courts.18 A prime example of this disagreement is the
continuing controversy about whether discrimination against individuals
with mental and physical disabilities qualifies as a requisite class-based,
invidiously discriminatory animus, thereby allowing these individuals to
recover under § 1985(3). 19 In Lake v. Arnold,2° the United States Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit answered that question in the affirma-
tive by holding that the mentally retarded are entitled to protection and
recovery under § 1985(3)." The Lake decision, however, is another un-
fortunate example of the "§ 1985(3) jurisprudence ... [which] has been
marred by fits and starts, plagued by inconsistencies, and left in flux by
16. Griffin, 403 U.S. at 102.
17. See infra Part II(B)(1).
18. See infra Part I; see also infra note 19.
19. See generally Lake v. Arnold, 112 F.3d 682, 686 (3d Cir. 1997) (recogniz-
ing the disagreement and allowing recovery for the disabled); D'Amato v. Wisc.
Gas Co., 760 F.2d 1474, 1486-87 (7th Cir. 1985) (disallowing recovery for the
disabled); Wilhelm v. Continental Title Co., 720 F.2d 1173, 1177 (10th Cir. 1983)
(prohibiting recovery for handicapped persons); People by Abrams v. 11 Comwell,
695 F.2d 34, 43 (2d Cir. 1982) (holding that mentally disabled individuals are a
protected class), vacated in part on other grounds, 718 F.2d 22 (2d Cir. 1983) (en
banc); Downs v. Sawtelle, 574 F.2d 1, 16 (1st Cir. 1978) (holding that the deaf do
not constitute a class for § 1985(3) purposes); Haston v. Tatham, 4 N.D.L.R. 372
(D. Utah 1994) (holding that disabled people not a recognizable class for § 1985(3)
purposes); Trautz v. Weisman, 819 F. Supp. 282 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (mental and
emotional disabilities covered); Tyus v. Ohio Dep't of Youth Servs., 606 F. Supp.
239, 246-47 (S.D. Ohio 1985) (handicapped persons covered); Corkery v. SuperX
Drugs Corp., 602 F. Supp. 42, 44-45 (M.D. Fla. 1985) (handicapped persons not
covered).
Larson by Larson v. Miller, 55 F.3d 1343, 1352 (8th Cir. 1995), did hold that
handicapped individuals could avail themselves of the protections of § 1985(3).
However, the Eighth Circuit later vacated this decision, not reaching the class-
based discriminatory animus issue. Larson by Larson v. Miller, 76 F.3d 1446 (8th
Cir. 1996) (en banc). Since the prior opinion has no value as precedent and pres-
ents arguments which are seen elsewhere, it will not be discussed in detail in this
Note.
20. 112 F.3d 682 (3d Cir. 1997).
21. Id. at 686.
Lake v. Arnold
the Supreme Court. 22
The story' of Lake, tragically, is not unfamiliar.23 In June of 1977,
sixteen-year-old Elizabeth Arnold Lake, a mentally retarded woman,
was taken to Tyrone Hospital by her parents.24 There, she allegedly un-
derwent a tubal ligation, 2' a sterilization process which prevents future
conception by interrupting the continuity of the oviducts.26 Elizabeth
Lake could not have given informed consent to such a procedure as she
was both illiterate and mentally disabled.27 Allegedly, Elizabeth Lake
remained oblivious to the nature of the procedure until she received a
medical examination in December 1993.28
On May 31, 1995, Elizabeth Lake, with her husband, Justin Lake,
filed suit in Pennsylvania state court against her parents, Tyrone Hospi-
tal, and two hospital physicians, alleging several state law claims, as
well as deprivation of civil rights under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985(3) and
1983.29 Tyrone Hospital removed the action to the United States District
Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania, where all defendants
moved to dismiss the claims. 30 A magistrate judge recommended dis-
missal of the federal claims and remanded the state claims to the Penn-
sylvania state court. 31 The magistrate judge found the § 1985(3) claim
insufficient as "handicapped persons were neither intended to be a class
nor reasonably [can] be considered to be a class for [the] purpose of
§ 1985(3).y32 The Lakes' § 1983 claim was deemed insufficient because
of their failure to adequately allege any state involvement in the con-
spired misconduct.33  The district court adopted these
22. Trautz v. Weisman, 819 F. Supp. 282, 291 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
23. American courts have dealt with the issues surrounding forced sterilization
of mentally retarded women from as early as the 1920's. See, e.g., Buck v. Bell,
274 U.S. 200 (1927).
24. See Lake, 112 F.3d at 684.
25. See id
26. See STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 976 (Marjory Spraycar ed., 26th
ed. 1995).





32. Lake, 112 F.3d at 684.
33. See id. The Third Circuit overturned the dismissal of the § 1983 claim,
expressing a hesitance to dismiss the claim at an earlier pleading stage. See id at
689.
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recommendations.
34
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in
a question of first impression, addressed the issue of whether Elizabeth
Lake's "status as a mentally retarded female places her within a cogni-
zable class entitled to protection under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)."" In a
seven-page opinion by Circuit Judge Mansmann, the Third Circuit re-
versed the order of the district court, holding that the statute had a wide
enough scope to protect handicapped victims of discrimination. 6 The
court reasoned that discrimination against the mentally handicapped,
like discrimination based on gender, "often rests on immutable charac-
teristics which have no relationship to ability.
3 7
The court drew additional support for its holding from several
sources. First, the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 had found
that disabled individuals had "been faced with restrictions and limita-
tions, subjected to a history of purposeful unequal treatment, and rele-
gated to a position of political powerlessness., 38 The court also noted
the general increase in recognition among both legislators and courts of
the plight of the disabled. 39 Finally, the court recognized that the "dis-
crimination documented against the handicapped in general has been
directed particularly at the mentally retarded in the context of involun-
tary sterilization. 40
Part I of this Note will sketch the relevant case law prior to Lake. Part
II will begin with a discussion of the origins of and rationale behind the
Although the parties cite a plethora of case law regarding standards
to be applied in evaluating the presence or absence of state action,
the undeveloped record makes application of that case law difficult.
While ultimately it will be necessary to navigate 'the legal morass
of the ever evolving state action doctrine,' we decline to do so at
this early stage in the proceedings.
Id. (quoting Eaton v. Grubbs, 329 F.2d 710 (4th Cir. 1964)).
34. See id. at 684.
35. Id. (footnote omitted).
36. Id. at 687.
37. Id
38. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7) (1994). The court found it particularly convincing
that cases which held handicapped individuals not to be covered by § 1985(3) were
decided prior to the enactment of the Americans with Disabilities Act. Lake, 112
F.3d at 688 n.1 1.
39. See Lake, 112 F.3d at 688 (citing Trautz v. Weisman, 819 F. Supp. 282,
294-95 (S.D.N.Y. 1993)); see also 65 U.S.L.W. 1170 ("The ruling [in Lake] sug-
gests an evolution in judicial thinking about mental disabilities.").
40. Lake, 112 F.3d at 688 (collecting scholarly works on the subject).
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class-based animus requirement of § 1985(3), followed by a considera-
tion of the major sources of confusion surrounding the class-based ani-
mus test and its presence in the Lake decision. Part II will conclude with
the suggestion that the class-based animus should not be used as a
means of limiting § 1985(3) actions. Part III will establish exactly what
rights are protected under § 1985(3) with a subsequent analysis of the
Lake decision. Part III will also illustrate that the newly proposed scope
of § 1985(3) has a narrow scope, but that this narrow scope has no det-
rimental effects for the handicapped.
I. FROM GRIFFIN TO LAKE
The relevant case law prior to Lake is a scattered array of opinions
appearing at all levels of the federal judiciary. This Part attempts to
sketch the history of these scattered cases chronologically, by discussing
Supreme Court decisions which provide a detailed analysis of § 1985(3),
as well as lower court decisions which apply § 1985(3) to the mentally
and physically disabled.
In 1971, as § 1985(3) celebrated its centennial anniversary, the Su-
preme Court revisited the long-neglected statute. In Griffin v. Brecken-
ridge,41 the Court reviewed a Fifth Circuit decision affirming the dis-
missal of a suit brought by several black men from Kemper County,
Mississippi.42 The defendants, two white men, under the mistaken belief
that the plaintiffs were civil rights workers, blocked off a road, dragged
the plaintiffs from their car, and beat them severely. 43 Relying on
Collins,44 the district court dismissed the claim because there were no
allegations of state action. 45 The Court of Appeals begrudgingly af-
firmed the dismissal, expressing its "'serious doubts' as to the 'contin-
ued vitality' of Collins.
46
The Supreme Court rejected the state action requirement of Collins
41. 403 U.S. 88 (1971).
42. See id. at 89, 92.
43. See id. at 90. The plaintiffs in their § 1985(3) action alleged that the defen-
dants had conspired to deny them of "rights to freedom of speech, movement, asso-
ciation and assembly; their right to petition their government for redress of their
grievances; their rights to be secure in their persons and their homes; and their
rights not to be enslaved nor deprived of life and liberty other than by due process
of law." Id
44. 341 U.S. 651 (1951). See supra notes 8, 9 and accompanying text.
45. Griffin, 403 U.S. at 92.
46. Id. (quoting Griffin v. Breckenridge, 410 F.2d 817, 823 (5th Cir. 1969)).
19991
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for several reasons. The Court concluded that the constitutional prob-
lems, which its decision in Collins tried to rectify through the state ac-
tion requirement, had disappeared through the "evolution of decisional
law. 4 7 In addition, the Court justified the rejection of the state action
requirement by looking to the language of § 1985(3) itself. The Court
noted that the statute applies to "two or more people in any State or Ter-
ritory" who "conspire or go in disguise on the highway or on the prem-
ises of another." 48 The Court was persuaded that "go[ing] in disguise"
would be so infrequently be applicable to official action and more often
applicable to "private marauders." 49 Hence, to construe § 1985(3) as
requiring state action would render the language of § 1985(3) inapplica-
ble in almost all circumstances.50 Furthermore, the Court noted that the
words "equal protection of the law" and "equal privileges and immuni-
ties under the laws" themselves do not require state action I Grffin also
overturned Collins because neither similar Reconstruction civil right
statutes 52 nor the legislative history of the Ku Klux Klan Act53 indicated
the need for a state action requirement in § 1985(3).
Immediately after availing § 1985(3) to victims of purely private con-
spiratorial conduct, Griffin limited the statute's scope. Admitting that
§ 1985(3) "was not intended to apply to all tortious, conspiratorial inter-
ferences with the rights of others," 54 the Court chose to avoid the "con-
stitutional shoals" of interpreting § 1985(3) as "general federal tort law"
by instituting a new element into the cause of action. 55 The Griffin Court
reinterpreted the equal protection language of the statute to require
"some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discrimina-
tory animus behind the conspirator's action. 56 The Court believed that
in so doing they were "giving full effect to the congressional purpose"
47. Id. at 95-96.
48. Id. at 96.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id at 97. "A century of Fourteenth Amendment adjudication has, in other
words, made it understandably difficult to conceive of what might constitute a dep-
rivation of the equal protection of the laws by private persons." Id.
52. Id. at 97-99.
53. Id. at99-101.
54. Id. at 101.
55. Id at 102.
56. Id. at 101-02.
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of § 1985(3)."
Ironically, this new element was not listed among the allegations nec-
essary for a plaintiffs complaint to properly state a § 1985(3) cause of
action. 58 The Court declined to decide "whether a conspiracy motivated
by invidiously discriminatory intent other than racial bias would be ac-
tionable under [§ 1985(3)]."' 9 The Court also declined to elaborate on
the new class-based animus, giving no hints as to what might qualify
under the "perhaps otherwise class-based" language of the opinion.
Lastly, the Griffin Court identified two grounds for the constitutional-
ity of § 1985(3). First, the Court was confident in Congress' power un-
der section two of the Thirteenth Amendment to prevent private indi-
viduals, as well as the States, from imposing any form of slavery.6° In
the alternative, Griffin also recognized that the right to interstate travel
57. Id.
58. Id. at 102-03.
To come within the legislation a complaint must allege that the de-
fendants did (1) 'conspire or go in disguise on the highway or on the
premises of another' (2) 'for the purpose of depriving, either di-
rectly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal pro-
tection of the laws, or o equal privileges and immunities under the
laws.' It must then assert that one or more of the conspirators (3)
did, or caused to be done, 'any act in furtherance of the object of
[the] conspiracy,' whereby another was (4a) 'injured in his person or
property' or (4b) 'deprived of having and exercising any right or
privilege of a citizen of the United States.'
Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)).
But c.f, Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 267-68 (1993)
(listing class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus among the necessary alle-
gations of § 1985(3)). The Griffin decision seems to indicate though that the class-
based, invidiously discriminatory animus constitutes part of the second element
listed. "The language [of § 1985(3)] requiring intent to deprive of equal protection
or equal privileges and immunities, means that there must be some racial, or per-
haps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus behind the con-
spirators' actions." Griffin, 403 U.S. at 102; see also Steven F. Shatz, The Second
Death of 42 US. C. Section 1985(3): The Use and Misuse of History in Statutory
Interpretation, 27 B.C. L. REV. 911, 917 (1986).
59. Griffin, 403 U.S. at 102 n.9.
60. Id at 105.
Surely there has never been any doubt of the power of Congress to
impose liability on private persons under § 2 of [the Thirteenth]
amendment 'for the amendment is not a mere prohibition of state
laws establishing or upholding slavery, but an absolute declaration
that slavery or involuntary servitude shall not exist in any part of the
United States.'
Id. (quoting The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883)).
1999]
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"is assertable against private as well as governmental interference.
'"61
This list of constitutional bases for § 1985(3) was not exclusive 62 and
was limited to the factual allegations of the controversy before the
Court. 63 With this factually limited holding, Griffin presented the Court
"no occasion .. .to trace out [§ 1985(3)'s] constitutionally permissible
periphery."
64
The statute was next construed by the First Circuit in Downs v. Saw-
telle.65 The court briefly discussed a § 1985(3) claim of a deaf mute
against those who allegedly conspired to sterilize her against her will.
66
The court dismissed the § 1985(3) claim because the plaintiff failed to
provide legal authority for the proposition that the deaf constitute a
protected class and because she failed to allege that the conspiracy was
caused by her membership in that class.67
A disabled individual first tried to recover damages under § 1985(3)
in Cain v. Archdiocese of Kansas City.68 A teacher brought suit against a
parochial school which terminated her teaching contract shortly before
classes were scheduled to begin. 69 The school explained that the reason
for the dismissal was her need to take medication to control a mild case
of epilepsy. 70 The United States District Court for the District of Kansas,
briefly ruling on her § 1985(3) claim, held that no precedent could be
found to justify considering disabled individuals a "class within the
meaning of § 1985(3) as construed by the Supreme Court in Griffin.'
Thus, the court declined to enlarge the scope of § 1985(3) to include
61. Id. at 105 (citing Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629-31 (1968)).
62. Id. at 107. "In identifying these two constitutional sources of congressional
power, we do not imply the absence of any other." Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. 574 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1978).
66. See id. at 16.
67. Id
68. 508 F. Supp. 1021 (D. Kan. 1981).
69. Id.
70. Id. at 1023. Epilepsy is a "chronic disorder characterized by paroxysmal
brain dysfunction due to excessive neuronal discharge, and usually associated with
some alteration of consciousness. The clinical manifestations of the attack may
vary from complex abnormalities of behavior including generalized or focal con-
vulsions to momentary spells of impaired consciousness." STEDMAN'S MEDICAL
DICTIONARY, supra note 26, at 584.
71. Cain, 508 F. Supp at 1027.
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disabilities.72
In People by Abrams v. 11 Cornwell Co., 73 a New York state agency
sought to purchase a home, intending to create a community facility for
mentally retarded adults. 74 In an effort to thwart this plan, anxious
neighbors living around the proposed center formed a partnership and
bought the home before the state agency could react.75 The state agency
sued the partnership alleging, among others, a § 1985(3) claim.76 On
appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
adopted the state's unopposed argument that the mentally retarded are a
class protected by § 1985(3). 77 The court noted that "[c]ases since Grif-
fin v. Breckenridge have been generous in applying section 1985(3) to
nonracial classifications, even though some of the classifications would
not receive strict scrutiny under the equal protection clause. 78 The court
fully acknowledged the contrary decisions in Cain and Downs but did
not consider the scant and unconvincing analysis in those cases to "have
foreclosed the issue. 79
The Supreme Court, once again, heard a § 1985(3) case in United
Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners, Local 610 v. Scott.80 This case
stemmed from an attack on a non-union construction site by several un-
ion sympathizers, which resulted in both vandalism of construction
equipment and violence against several construction workers.8' The
plaintiffs sued under § 1985(3), among other claims, to recover for the
defendants' conspiracy to deprive them of their First and Fourteenth
Amendment rights.82 The district court held in favor of the plaintiffs.8 3
72. Id.
73. 695 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1982), vacated in part on other grounds, 718 F.2d 22
(2d Cir. 1983) (en banc).
74. Id. at 37.
75. Id
76. Id.
77. Id. at 42.
78. Id. (collecting examples of such classifications from the Eighth, Sixth, and
Ninth Circuits).
79. Id. at 43.
80. 463 U.S. 825 (1983) (5-4 decision).
81. Id. at 828.
82. Id. at 829-30. "Congress shall make no law.., abridging the freedom of
speech .. .." U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added). "[N]or shall any State de-
prive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; .... " U.S.
CONST. amend XIV, § I (emphasis added).
83. Scott, 463 U.S. at 829.
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The construction company and several of its employees appealed to the
Court of Appeals which affirmed the district court's decision. 84 In re-
versing the Court of Appeals, a narrow majority of the Supreme Court
attempted to clarify two aspects of § 1985(3).8"
First, the Court disagreed with the lower courts' conclusions that a
private conspiracy to violate another's First Amendment rights would be
actionable under § 1985(3).86 This holding is premised on the knowledge
that § 1985(3) "provides no substantial rights itself" and that "the rights,
privileges, and immunities that § 1985(3) vindicates must be found
elsewhere. ' 7 Having thus acknowledged the purely remedial nature of §
1985(3), the Court noted that both the First and Fourteenth Amendments
guarantee individuals' rights against certain types of governmental in-
fringement.8 8 Hence, due to the language of the amendments, "it would
be untenable to contend that either of those provisions could be violated
by a conspiracy that did not somehow involve or affect a state."8 9 A
purely private § 1985(3) conspiracy, the Court decided, must be aimed
at some rights which are "protected against private, as well as official,
encroachment." 90 Without some state involvement, no First or Four-
teenth Amendment rights were violated. Without a violation of rights,
§ 1985(3) could not provide a remedy.
Then, the Scott court considered the class-based animus requirement
of § 1985(3). The Court rejected the Court of Appeals' interpretation of
the historical background of § 1985(3). The Court of Appeals contended
that political groups, in particular Republicans, were among the Ku Klux
Klan victims in the Reconstruction South for whom § 1985(3) was
originally enacted. 91 From this protection of a political group, the Court
of Appeals recognized, by analogy, protection for the plaintiffs under
§ 1985(3) since "an economic group such as those who preferred non-
84. Id. at 829-30.
85. One scholar has suggested that Justice White was motivated to make such
clarifications by the desire to save lower courts from analyzing the constitutionality
of § 1985(3) every time and by a desire to limit the rising tide of § 1985(3) actions.
See Gormley, supra note 3, at 557.
86. See Scott, 463 U.S. at 830.
87. Id at 833 (citing Great American Fed. S. & L. Ass'n v. Novotny, 442 U.S.
366, 372 (1979)).
88. See id. at 831.
89. Id
90. Id. at 833.
91. Id. at 835.
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union association is 'closely akin' to the animus against political asso-
ciation. 92 The Supreme Court viewed the legislative history presented
in support of that assertion with great skepticism.93 The Court found the
legislative history unpersuasive as no evidence could be presented to
indicate that § 1985(3) originally aimed at preventing conspiracies based
on economic views. 94 This strong language in Scott not only denied
protection to economic groups, but also indicated the Court's general
reluctance to extend § 1985(3) protection beyond race.95
Justice Blackmun penned an equally strong dissent criticizing the
majority opinion in Scott.9 6 The dissenters opposed what they viewed as
the majority's "crabbed and uninformed reading of the words of §
1985(3)." 9' In response to the contention that § 1985(3) protects against
conspiracies to violate First and Fourteenth Amendment rights only if
state involvement is shown, the dissent argued that the legislative his-
tory of the statute "unambiguously establishes" an intent to prohibit
purely private conspiracies to deprive others of all federal rights.9" The
dissent places considerable weight on the fact that, as originally drafted,
section two of the Ku Klux Klan Act, which now is codified at §
1985(3), imposed criminal liability for conspiracies to commit certain
enumerated acts.99 In the dissent's opinion, the original draft reflects the
92. Id. at 835-36.
93. Id at 836-38.
94. Id. at 837. The Court stated:
We find no convincing support in the legislative history for the
proposition that [§ 1985(3)1 was intended to reach conspiracies mo-
tivated by bias towards others on account of their economic views,
status, or activities. Such a construction would extend § 1985(3)
into the economic life of the country in a way that we doubt that the




96. Justices Brennan, Marshall, and O'Connor joined in Justice Blackmun's
dissenting opinion. Id. at 839.
97. Id at 854 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
98. Id at 841-48.
99. The original version of section two read:
That if two or more persons shall, within the limits of any State,
band or conspire together to do any act in violation of the rights,
privileges, or immunities of anotherperson, which, being committed
within a place under the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the
United States, would, under any law of the United States then in
force, constitute the crime of either murder, manslaughter, mayhem,
robbery, assault and battery, perjury, subornation of perjury, crimi-
nal obstruction of legal process or resistance of officers in discharge
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belief of the legislation's supporters that "the Fourteenth Amendment
had altered the balance between the States and the National Government
so that Congress now was permitted to protect life, liberty, and property
by legislating directly against criminal activity."'00 Although this radical
belief was later tempered by subsequent amendments to § 1985(3), the
majority of the statute's supporters believed their Fourteenth Amend-
ment powers extended to purely private action.'
0 '
Further, the dissent deemed the remarks of Representative Garfield
indicative of another justification for the statute's reach. Garfield stated
that when states fail to provide equal protection, "it is undoubtedly
within the power of Congress to provide by law for the punishment of
all persons, official or private, who shall invade these rights [guaranteed
by the Civil War Amendments], and who by violence, threats, or intimi-
dation shall deprive any citizen of their fullest enjoyment."'' 2 Garfield's
belief is a consistent thread throughout the debates on section two of the
Ku Klux Klan Act. 0 3 The dissent likewise stated with confidence that
"Congress did not intend any requirement of state involvement in either
a civil or criminal action under section two.
°10 4
In response to the majority's approach to the class-based animus is-
sue, the dissent asserted that "Congress intended to provide a federal
remedy for all classes that seek to exercise their legal rights in unpro-
tected circumstances similar to those of the victims of Klan violence.' ' 5
The classes protected were not to be determined by simple categories,
of official duty, arson, or larceny; and if one or more of the parties
to said conspiracy shall do any act to effect the object thereof, all
the parties to or engaged in said conspiracy, whether principals or
aceessories [sic], shal be deemed guilty of a felony, and, upon con-
viction thereof, shall be liable, &c., and the crime shall be punish-
able as such in the -courts of the United States.
CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., App. 68-69 (March 28, 1871) (statement of
Rep. Shellabarger) (quoting H.R. 320, § 2, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. (1871)).
100. Scott, 463 U.S. at 842 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
101. Id. at 842 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun stated that the
moderate Republicans, who supported these amendments and who held consider-
able sway in that Congress, believed that "Congress had authority to reach private
conduct by virtue of its power to protect the rights of national citizenship. They
believed that the Fourteenth Amendment rights were possessed by persons regard-
less of the presence of state action." Id
102. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., App. 153 (Apr. 4, 1871).
103. Scott, 463 U.S. at 846 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
104. Id.
105. Id. at 851.
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but rather by a "functional definition" which would reflect the 1871
Congress' concern for those groups which might suffer from a "system-
atic maladministration of [the laws]" due to prejudice or bias.10 6 Apply-
ing this test to Scott, the dissent felt economic groups clearly fell within
the intended protection of § 1985(3).107 Further, the majority's failure to
protect economic-based groups clashed with the dissenting justices'
historical understanding of Reconstruction.'0 8 According to the dissent,
"economic migrants," such as carpetbaggers and the newly freed slaves,
who flooded labor markets in the years following the Civil War, were
prime targets of Klan violence.'0 9
The protection of disabled individuals under § 1985(3) was next con-
sidered by the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in
Wilhelm v. Continental Title Company."0 There, the defendant company
fired the plaintiff shortly after learning that he had multiple sclerosis."'
The district court dismissed his § 1985(3) claim for failure to adequately
allege that his discharge was invidious."l 2 In affirming the dismissal, the
court of appeals in Wilhelm relied heavily on the Scott decision's analy-
sis of § 1985(3)'s legislative history." 3 In light of Scott, the Tenth Cir-
cuit saw no reason to extend § 1985(3) protection to "classes other than
those involved in the strife in the South in 1871 with which Congress
was then concerned."'" 4 The opinion in Wilhelm warned that "[i]n fact
from Scott we get a signal that the classes covered by § 1985(3) should
not be extended beyond those already expressly provided by the [Su-
preme] Court."'"15
The Wilhelm court went on to consider whether handicapped indi-
viduals were a class for the purposes of § 1985(3). The court did not
106. Id.
107. Id. at 852-54.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 852.
110. 720 F.2d 1173 (10th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1103 (1984).
111. Id. at 1174. Multiple sclerosis is defined as "a common demyelinating
disorder of the central nervous system, causing patches of sclerosis (plagues) in the
brain and spinal cord." STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY, supra note 26, at 1583.
112. Wilhelm, 720 F.2d at 1175 (explaining the requirement that "the class must
be invidious and the conspiracy against the plaintiff was 'because' of class mem-
bership").
113. Id. at 1175-76.
114. Id. at 1176.
115. Id.
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allow this application of the statute since "the variations in each cate-
gory [of disability] are infinite and as a consequence the term 'handi-
capped' does not have a definition capable of a reasonably precise ap-
plication."'"16 The court stated that it would be compelled by Scott to
affirm "even if there could be here developed by further pleadings a
class of handicapped persons with sufficient conditions or factors in
common derived from their physical condition to be ascertainable or
identifiable."' " Clearly, the Wilhelm court interpreted the Scott decision
to have limited § 1985(3) protection solely to those classes which were
victims of the Ku Klux Klan's violence and mayhem in the Reconstruc-
tion South.
In Corkery v. SuperX Drugs Corp.," 18 the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida followed the lead of the Wilhelm deci-
sion. There, the plaintiff brought a § 1985(3) claim against his employer
when he was terminated after having serious congestive heart failure at
the age of forty-two." 9 Advancing the same arguments as and citing to
Wilhelm, the court denied protection to the handicapped because they
were not "a class contemplated or protected by § 1985(3).,, 120 The court
distinguished its holding from the contrary decision expressed in People
by Abrams by noting that the "mentally handicapped" in that case con-
stituted a more limited class than the broad group of "handicapped indi-
viduals" presented in the instant case.
12 1
In Tyus v. Ohio Department of Youth Services, 22 the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Ohio apparently did not re-
ceive the same signal as the Wilhelm and Corkery courts. Here, a man
brought suit against an Ohio state agency for discharging him because of
his epilepsy. 23 Tyus recognized the fact that § 1985(3) was originally
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. 602 F. Supp. 42 (M.D. Fla. 1985).
119. Id. at 44. Congestive heart failure results from an "inadequacy of the heart
so that as a pump it fails to maintain the circulation of the blood, with the result that
congestion and edema develop in the tissues." STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY,
supra note 26, at 626.
120. Corkery, 602 F. Supp. at 44.
121. See id at 44-45. The plaintiff asserted in his complaint that he was a
"member of the class of handicapped employees toward whom the conspirators'
discriminatory animus was directed." Id. at 44.
122. 606 F. Supp. 239 (S.D. Ohio 1985).
123. Id. at 241. For a definition of epilepsy, see supra note 70.
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enacted for the protection of blacks and union sympathizers in the
South. 24 However, this original intent was irrelevant because "§ 1985(3)
makes no references to race, but rather prohibits conspiracies to deprive
any person of the equal protection of the laws.' 25 By analogizing
§ 1985(3) to other Reconstruction legislation, Tyus extended the stat-
ute's protection beyond its original beneficiaries to any citizen. Just as
the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments are not to be limited to pro-
tecting only those for whom they were originally enacted, so should §
1985(3) be free from such artificial restrictions. 26 Further, Tyus justified
the extension of § 1985(3) to disabled people by noting that they often
are burdened by a "stigma of inferiority" and a lack of significant politi-
cal power.
27
The issue was next considered by the United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit in D'Amato v. Wisconsin Gas Company. 28 The
plaintiff brought suit alleging a § 1985(3) claim after he was discharged
by a government contractor because his acrophobia' 29 prevented him
from going into tall buildings as his job required. 30 In denying disabled
individuals the opportunity to recover under § 1985(3), the Seventh Cir-
cuit adopted the strict reading of class-based animus found in the Scott
and Wilhelm decisions. Concern about extending § 1985(3) beyond its
originally intended parameters dissuaded the court in D'Amato from
extending the statute to the handicapped.' 3' The D'Amato court also fo-
cused on the difficulty in defining the class of disabled individuals
which varies "greatly from immediately noticeable physical handicaps
to ones not at first obvious or those revealed only by a medical exami-
124. Id. at 246.
125. Id. at 245-46.
126. Id. The court stated that:
The language of § 1985(3) gives no indication that racial discrimi-
nation is a requisite element of a cause of action thereunder. To en-
graft such a limitation would bring the statute into anomalous con-
trast with comparable Reconstruction civil rights legislation, under
which a wide variety of nonracial classes have won relief from dis-
criminatory treatment.
Id
127. Id. at 247.
128. 760 F.2d 1474 (7th Cir. 1985).
129. "A morbid fear of heights." STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY, supra note
26, at 19.
130. D'Amato, 760 F.2d at 1476.
131. Id. at 1486. "The legislative history of section 1985(3) does not suggest a
concern for the handicapped." Id.
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nation."' 132 Further, the Seventh Circuit was hesitant to consider the
handicapped as a class, because some handicaps "may be overcome" and
because "being handicapped is not a historically suspect class such as
race, national origin, or sex."133
Section 1985(3) was later considered by the Supreme Court in its
controversial 34 decision Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic.3 5
In this case, abortion clinics and abortion rights organizations brought a
§ 1985(3) claim against Operation Rescue, an antiabortion organization,
to enjoin their attempts to block and deny access to various abortion
clinics in the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area.136 Justice Scalia's
majority opinion 137 first dealt with the issue of whether "opposition to
abortion" formed an appropriate class-based animus. It then considered
whether the rights denied by Operation Rescue were covered by
§ 1985(3).
Bray's discussion of class-based animus begins by defining what can-
not be included in such an animus. To prevent § 1985(3) from being a
"general federal tort law," a class-based animus cannot simply be a
"group of individuals who share a desire to engage in conduct that the
§ 1985(3) defendant disfavors."' 138 Citing Blackmun's dissent in Scott,
Justice Scalia held that "women seeking abortions" could not be a class
for the purposes of § 1985(3) because a class "cannot be defined simply
as the group of victims of the tortious action."
1 39
The Court also held that Operation Rescue's protests were not a gen-
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. For a highly critical treatment of the Bray decision See, Georgia M. Sulli-
van, Note, Protection of Constitutional Guarantees under 42 US.C. Section
1985(3): Operation Rescue's "Summer of Mercy", 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 237
(1992).
135. 506 U.S. 263 (1993).
136. Id. at 266.
137. Justice Kennedy wrote a concurring opinion which notes that the dissenting
opinions do not agree on a common rationale and that 42 U.S.C. § 10501 provides
for federal intervention in situations where "state and local resources are inade-
quate to protect the lives and property of citizens or to enforce the criminal law."
Id. at 287 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 10502(3) (1994)). Justice Souter wrote an opinion
concurring in part and dissenting in part. Id. at 288. Justice Stevens dissented in
an opinion which Justice Blackmun joined. Id. at 307. Justice O'Connor also
wrote a dissenting opinion which Justice Blackmun also joined. Id at 345.
138. Bray, 506 U.S. at 269.
139. Id. (citing Scott, 463 U.S. at 850 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)).
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eral class-based discrimination against women. Adopting a standard
from equal protection jurisprudence,140 Bray required that class-based
animus affect a "discriminatory purpose ... [which] implies more than
intent as volition or intent as awareness of consequences. It implies that
the decision maker ... selected or reaffirmed a particular course of ac-
tion at least in part 'because of,' not merely 'in spite of,' its adverse
effects upon an identifiable group."'' Simply because Operation Res-
cue's blockades infringed on a woman's right to enter an abortion clinic
more than a man's, because only women can become pregnant, this did
not necessarily imply that its actions were discriminatory against women
per se.142 Refusing to equate Operation Rescue's actions with such in-
vidious discrimination as racism, the Court held that "[t]his is not the
stuff out of which a § 1985(3) 'invidiously discriminatory animus' is
created."'
143
The Bray Court. also could not identify any § 1985(3) protection
against a private conspiracy which applied to the rights of the abortion
clinics. The respondent clinics first argued that Operation Rescue's ac-
tivities denied persons the right to interstate travel because their patients
sometimes traveled from other states to come to their clinics. 44 This
argument was rejected because denial of interstate travel was not the
sole purpose of Operation Rescues protests,' 45 and because previously
the Court held that denial of the right of interstate travel requires either a
physical restraint of travel at state borders or discriminatory treatment
against interstate travelers. 4 6 The Court also ruled the respondents' sec-
ond asserted right, the right to an abortion, to be an inadequate basis for
140. The Court was careful to point out that this standard was not adopted be-
cause equal protection jurisprudence is simply automatically incorporated into §
1985(3) analysis, but because "it is inherent in the requirement of class-based ani-
mus, i.e., an animus requirement based on class." Id. at 273 n.4.
141. Id. at 271-72 (quoting Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256
(1979)).
142. 506 U.S. at 271.
143. Id. at 274.
144. Id. at 274.
145. Id. at 276. "A conspiracy is not 'for the purpose' of denying equal protec-
tion simply because it has an effect upon a protected right." Id. Here, Operation
Rescue's opposition to abortion was not an attempt to restrict interstate travel.
Clearly, "it is irrelevant to their opposition whether the abortion is performed after
interstate travel." Id.
146. Id. at 277 (citing Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 60 n.6 (1982)).
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their § 1985(3) claim. 47 The Court reaffirmed the strict view of the
Scott decision, that § 1985(3) only prohibits conspiracies "aimed at in-
terfering with rights . . . protected against private, as well as official,
encroachment."'' 48 Justice Scalia admitted that few rights fall into this
category, 149 but strongly asserted that the right to an abortion simply was
not one of these rights.
50
In Trautz v. Weisman,15 1 the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York heard a § 1985(3) claim brought by the
residents of a facility for the mentally and emotionally disabled against
the owners and operators of the facility. The complaint alleged that the
deplorable conditions there resulted from a conspiracy to deny its resi-
dents equal protection. 52 The court in Trautz focused solely on whether
there was discriminatory class-based animus.153 The court first noted two
standards for determining whether § 1985(3) protection extended to a
particular minority. The group could either be "discrete and insular,"
receiving special protection under the equal protection clause because of
inherent personal characteristics, 1 4 or a "well-defined and traditionally
disadvantaged group."' 55 Trautz then attacked the D'Amato decision for
failing to place the disabled in either of these categories. The court as-
serted that, although a disability may not be apparent, "it remains an
inherent personal characteristic.' 56 Further, Trautz observed that the
very fact that a disability may be overcome indicates that a disability is
"an immutable obstacle often created only by an accident of birth, not
147. Id. at 278.
148. Id. at 278 (citing Carpenters v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 833 (1983)).
149. Id (listing only the Thirteenth Amendment right to be free from slavery
and the right to interstate travel).
150. Id Justice Scalia argued that it would be "peculiar" to grant the right of
abortion "that preferred position," of being protected against private encroachment,
while other rights more explicit in the Constitution, like the right to free speech, do
not hold that status. Id. He further noted that the more general right to privacy,
from which the right of abortion is derived, clearly is not protected against private
infringement. Id. "A burglar does not violate the Fourth Amendment, for example,
nor does a mugger violate the Fourteenth." Id.
151. 819 F. Supp. 282 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
152. Id. at 284-85.
153. Id. at 290 n.5.
154. Id. at 291 (citing Browder v. Tipton, 630 F.2d 1149, 1150 (6th Cir. 1980)).
155. Id. (citing Orshan v. Anker, 489 F. Supp. 820 (E.D.N.Y. 1980)).
156. Id. at 292.
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unlike race, gender, or national origin." 15 The court proceeded to
strengthen its argument by pointing to the language of the Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990,158 which, ii the court's opinion, clearly
"represents a comprehensive national mandate to eliminate discrimina-
tion against individuals with disabilities."' 9 Trautz also criticized
D'Amato's devotion to restricting § 1985(3)'s protection to the origi-
nally intended recipients by pointing out that two groups, women and
religious minorities, were clearly not within the original ambit of §
1985(3) in 1871, but receive protection under the statute today.1
60
II. THE CONFUSION OF THE CLASS-BASED, INVIDIOUSLY
DISCRIMINATORY ANIMUS
Since Griffin, the class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus re-
quirement has caused great confusion in § 1985(3) jurisprudence, lead-
ing to incongruous court decisions. Women were granted protection un-
der § 1985(3) by some courts,' 61 while other courts denied such protec-
tion. 62 Federal officers were protected, 163 but county sheriffs officers
157. Id.
158. 42 U.S.C. § 12101. The findings and purposes section of that Act provides
in relevant part:
Unlike individuals who have experienced discrimination on the ba-
sis of race, color, sex, national origin, religion, or age, individuals
who have experienced discrimination on the basis of disability have
often no legal recourse to redress such discrimination .... Individu-
als with disabilities are a discrete and insular minority who have
been faced with restrictions and limitations, subjected to a history of
purposeful unequal treatment, and relegated to a position of political
powerlessness in our society, based on characteristics that are be-
yond the control of such individuals ..
42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(4), (7).
159. Trautz, 819 F. Supp. at 294.
160. Id. (citing Life Ins. Co. of North America v. Reichardt, 591 F.2d 499 (9th
Cir. 1979) (extending protection to women); Marlowe v. Fisher Body, 489 F.2d
1057 (6th Cir. 1973) (extending protection to religious groups)).
161. See Libertad v. Welch, 53 F.3d 428 (1st Cir. 1995) (women are a "pro-
tected class"); Padway v. Palches, 665 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1982) (class-based sex
discrimination is actionable under § 1985(3) actions); Conroy v. Conroy, 575 F.2d
175, 177 (8th Cir. 1978). See generally Annotation, Applicability of 42 US.C. §
1985(3) to Sex-Based Discrimination, 46 A.L.R. FED 342 (1980).
162. See Cohen v. Illinois Inst. of Technology, 524 F.2d 818 (7th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 425 U.S. 943 (1976); Johnson v. City of Cincinnati, 450 F.2d 796
(6th Cir. 1971).
163. See Stem v. United States Gypsum, Inc., 547 F.2d 1329 (7th Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 975 (1977) (dicta).
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were not.164 Perhaps more illustrative of the incoherence that the issue
has engendered is the case in which members of a single white, middle
class family were protected under § 1985(3),165 while groups of families
were turned away. 166 The inconsistency of certain federal courts ex-
tending § 1985(3) protections to disabled individuals while other courts
deny these protections also demonstrates the confusion surrounding the
statute.
A. The Birth and Invalidity of the Class-Based
Animus Requirement
The single paragraph in Griffin which injects the class-based animus
element into § 1985(3) jurisprudence evidences concern surrounding the
expansion of the statute beyond a point which might upset the balance of
power between the federal and state governments.167 The Court made it
clear that the invidiously discriminatory animus element was created to
prevent the statute from becoming a "general federal tort law."' 168 The
Griffin court cites the comments of Representatives Willard and Shella-
barger to justify the contention that class-based animus was the "con-
gressional purpose.' 69
164. See Canlis v. San Joaquin Sheriff's Posse Comitatus, 641 F.2d 711 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 711, 717 (1981).
165. See Azar v. Conley, 456 F.2d 1382, 1386 (6th Cir. 1972).'
166. See Smith v. Armstrong, 396 F. Supp. 753 (N.D. Tex.), af'd, 524 F.2d
1231 (5th Cir. 1975).
167. The federal government is one of limited powers, possessing only those
powers affirmatively granted to it in the Constitution. The rest of the powers of
governance remain in the hands of the states. See U.S. CONST. AMEND X. If
§ 1985(3) was interpreted broadly and allowed to reach any private conspiracy,
then almost every crime, tort, and breach of contract committed by two or more
people would fall within the scope of the statute. Such federal enforcement of
protection traditionally provided by the states would clearly upset the balance of
federalism. In this sense, a general federal tort law is impermissible. See generally
GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 77-78 (12th ed. 1991).
168. Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971).
The constitutional shoals that would lie in the path of interpreting
§ 1985(3) as a general federal tort law can be avoided by giving full
effect to the congressional purpose - by requiring, as an element of
the cause of action, the kind of invidiously discriminatory motiva-
tion stressed by the sponsors of the limiting amendment.
Id.
169. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., App. 188 (1871). Representative
Willard argued that inserting the "equal protection" and the "equal privileges and
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However, this concern over the constitutional problems of an overly
broad § 1985(3) seems to be more that of the Court than that of the
Forty-Second Congress. Admittedly, the statute's draftsmen in 1871
envisioned a certain type of intent to prevent § 1985(3) from being used
as a federal usurpation of state powers. 170 However, it was the Court in
1971 which defined this intent as being "class-based." No mention of a
class-based requirement exists anywhere in the legislative history.' Nor
does the legislative history indicate an intent to limit the scope of
§ 1985(3) to the prevention of racial bias, as the Scott opinion
suggests. 172 Thus, even though some discriminatory intent was required
by the Forty-Second Congress, the Griffin Court unjustifiably added the
class-based aspect on the basis of history.
On the other hand, the comments of Representatives Willard and
Shellabarger clearly illustrate that some type of mens rea requirement
was intended. 173 Because § 1985(3) was meant to curb the activities of
the Ku Klux Klan in the Reconstruction South, 174 one can assume that its
draftsmen in 1871 wished to require an intent somewhat akin to the
mental state which drove the Klan to their heinous acts. However, such
hatred, bigotry, and ignorance are hard to describe in mere words. The
immunities" language,
provid[ed] that the essence of the crime should consist in the intent
to deprive a person of the equal protection of the laws and of equal
privileges and immunities under the laws; in other words, that the
Constitution secured, and was only intended to secure, equality of
rights and immunities, and that we could only punish by United
States laws a denial of that equality.
Id.
Representative Shellabarger stated that
The object of the amendment is ... to confine the authority of this
law to the prevention of deprivations which shall attack the equality
of rights of American citizens; that any violation of the right, the
animus and effect of which is to strike down the citizen, to the end
that he may not enjoy equality of rights as contrasted with his and
other citizen's rights, shall be within the scope of the remedies of
this section.
CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., 478 (1871).
170. See CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., 478 (1871) (comments of Rep.
Shellabarger).
171. See McDonald, supra note 3, at 489. "The status of victims [protected by
§ 1985(3)] basically was irrelevant." Id at 491; see also Shatz, supra note 58, at
928-29.
172. See Shatz, supra note 58, at 929.
173. See supra note 162.
174. See supra note 3.
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terms "class-based, invidious discriminatory animus" hardly seem to
adequately characterize the sadistic and evil thoughts which must have
filled the hearts and minds of Klan members as they lynched black men
throughout the South. In other words, the terms' inadequacy, and thus
the confusion surrounding class-based animus, could have resulted from
a difficulty of description.
B. More "Class-Based" Confusion
Some of the confusion surrounding the Griffin Court's requirement of
a class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus can be attributed to the
semantic problem mentioned above. This, however, is not the sole
source of the confusion. Two other factors are clearly at fault. In gen-
eral, the U.S. Supreme Court has failed to provide helpful guidance on
the proper determination of class-based animus. Furthermore, lower fed-
eral courts have mistakenly shifted their focus in the determination of
class-based animus from the defendant's intent to the plaintiffs status.
1. Lack of Guidance from Supreme Court
The jurisprudence of § 1985(3) has not been well-developed by the
Supreme Court. The Court's treatment of the class-based animus issue
has been especially scant. The Griffin opinion did not elaborate on what
was meant by its insistence that "there be some racial, or perhaps other-
wise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus behind the con-
spirators' action."'75 In a footnote to this language, the Court explicitly
declined to comment on the possible extent of the "perhaps" clause.
7 6
Since the Court introduced the class requirement into § 1985(3), the
Court has had the opportunity to construe the statute only three addi-
tional times.'77 In one such occasion, the Court reversed the lower deci-
sion without even reaching the class-based animus issue. 178 By leaving
175. See Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971).
176. See id. at 102 n.9. "We need not decide, given the facts of this case,
whether a conspiracy motivated by invidiously discriminatory intent other than
racial bias would be actionable under the portion of § 1985(3) before us." Id.
177. See Great Am. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366 (1979);
United Bhd. of Carpenters and Joiners, Local 610 v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825 (1983);
Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263 (1993).
178. See Novotny, 442 U.S. at 378 (holding that § 1985(3) may not be invoked
to redress violations of Title VII without addressing class-based animus). After
being discharged, a male employee brought suit under § 1985(3) against his former
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the lower courts to formulate their own differing standards of class-
based animus, the Supreme Court has contributed to the confusion sur-
rounding § 1985(3). 179
However, blame should cautiously be placed on the Supreme Court.
The Court has had only limited opportunities to discuss the class-based
animus requirement of § 1985(3).I s° On these occasions, of course, the
justices were only empowered to rule on the particular facts presented in
the case at hand and the controversies before them.' 8 ' Although the
lower courts would benefit greatly from a long, illuminating Supreme
Court opinion detailing the exact length and breath of § 1985(3), such a
decision may be both imprudent and unconstitutional. The Supreme
Court has not provided extensive guidance on § 1985(3), but perhaps it
has not had any cases which presented the opportunity for providing
such guidance.
2. Mistaken Shift in Focus
The Klan's terror in the Reconstruction South clearly was aimed at
employer claiming that his support for his fellow female employees resulted in a
conspiracy which deprived him of rights created by Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964. Id. at 368-69. The Court concluded that "§ 1985(3) may not be in-
voked to redress violations of Title VII." Id at 378. The Court did not address the
class-based animus issues confronted by the Third Circuit, i.e. whether § 1985(3)
protected against a discriminatory animus against women and whether a male in-
jured by such a conspiracy can also recover under the statute. Novotny v. Great
Am. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 584 F.2d 1235, 1240-45 (3d Cir. 1978), rev'd 442
U.S. 366 (1979).
179. See John Gibeaut, Reproductive, Disability Rights Mix in KKK Act Cases,
83 A.B.A. J. 36 (Aug. 1997). "Like the Scarecrow in the Wizard of Oz, the 3rd
Circuit could have gone either way [in the Lake decision]." Id. at 36. "But the
[Supreme] Court has not drawn an exact line on what constitutes a class, leaving
the lower courts to figure it out for themselves." Id. at 36-37.
180. See Griffin, 403 U.S. at 102 n.9. "We need not decide, given the facts of
this case, whether a conspiracy motivated by invidiously discriminatory intent
other than racial bias would be actionable under the portion of § 1985(3) before
us." Id.
181. "The judicial Power [of the Supreme Court] shall extend to all Cases, in
Law and Equity... [and] to Controversies between two or more States. ... " U.S.
CONST. art. Il1, § 2. For a discussion of the case and controversy limit on the
Court's judicial power and the Court's prudential hesitance to give advisory opin-
ions, see generally, GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1590-98 (12th ed.
1991). "Ever since [1793], it has been accepted that federal courts cannot give
advisory opinions." Id. at 1594.
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various "classes.' ' 182 Hence, the Griffin inclusion of the term "class-
based" in the intent requirement of § 1985(3) seems appropriate. The
confusion in interpreting the class-based animus, however, has resulted
from lower courts focusing too heavily on the classifications of
§ 1985(3) plaintiffs. Even though the language of Griffin requires "some
racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory
animus behind the conspirators' [defendants '] action,"' 183 courts have
mistakenly addressed the issue in terms of whether the plaintiffs class
qualifies for § 1985(3) protection. 184 The question was, "What classes
qualify?" The answer was considered in the abstract, making reference
mostly to the characteristics of the plaintiffs class, with little reference
to the actual animus of the conspirators." 5
Through this mistaken analysis, several "tests" have developed to
determine the parameters for class qualifications under § 1985(3). These
tests have been difficult to justify and even more difficult to distinguish
from one another.1 6 Some of these tests granted protection only to
182. See CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., Ist Sess., 317 (remarks of Rep. Shellabar-
ger).
183. Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971) (emphasis added).
184. See, e.g., D'Amato v. Wisc. Gas Co., 760 F.2d 1474, 1486-87 (7th Cir.
1985); Wilhelm v. Continental Title Co., 720 F.2d 1173, 1176 (10th Cir. 1983);
People by Abrams v. 11 Cornwell Co., 695 F.2d 34, 42 (2d Cir. 1982); Cain v.
Archdiocese of Kansas City, 508 F. Supp. 1021, 1027 (D. Kan. 1981).
185. See, e.g., Lake v. Arnold, 112 F.3d 682, 684-85; infra Part II(C) on confu-
sion in Lake; Downs v. Sawtelle, 574 F.2d 1, 16 (1st Cir. 1978) (dismissing action
because plaintiff "failed to present authority for her assertion that the deaf consti-
tute a class for the purposes of 42 U.S.C. sec. 1985"); Novotny v. Great Am. Fed.
Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 584 F.2d 1235, 1240-41 n.19 (3d Cir. 1978) (collecting cases
establishing which classes qualify and which do not); Cain v. Archdiocese of Kan-
sas City, 508 F. Supp. 1021, 1027 (D. Kan. 1981) ("We have been unable to dis-
cover any cases ... which hold that handicapped persons constitute a 'class' within
the meaning of § 1985(3)."); United Bhd. of Carpenters and Joiners, Local 610 v.
Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 836-37 (1983); Wilhelm v. Continental Title Co., 720 F.2d
1173, 1176 (10th Cir. 1983) ("The variations in each category [of disability] are
infinite and as a consequence the term 'handicapped' does not have a definition
capable of a reasonably precise application for [§ 1985(3)] purposes."); Tyus v.
Ohio Dept. of Youth Serv., 606 F. Supp. 239, 247 (S.D. Ohio 1985) (considering
whether the handicapped qualify as a class); D'Amato v. Wisc. Gas Co., 760 F.2d
1474, 1486 (7th Cir. 1985) (considering the nature of being handicapped in the
determination of whether they constitute a class); Trautz v. Weisman, 819 F. Supp.
282, 291-95 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
186. For works which collect these tests and argue the relative merits of each
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groups deemed to be within the historical intent of § 1985(3);87 some
granted protection to "discrete and insular" minorities;,88 some granted
protection to groups with immutable characteristics; 8 9 some granted
protection to classes warranting strict scrutiny; 190 and still others pro-
tected only those groups which were clearly defined.' 91 The shift in fo-
cus from the defendant's discriminatory intent to the plaintiffs member-
ship in a class allowed scholars to compile comprehensive lists of
groups which received protection under § 1985(3). 192 Perhaps, the shift
in focus can be attributed to the ease with which a court can determine
whether a particular class deserves protection. A court may be tempted
to abdicate its duty when faced with the relatively more difficult task of
determining the highly factual question of whether a defendant's actions
were invidiously discriminatory. Whatever the reason, this mistaken
shift in focus, along with the lack of Supreme Court guidance, is one of
the' prime culprits contributing to the confusion and incongruity linger-
ing in the class-based animus issue.
see, Class-Based Animus, supra note 2, at 645-53; Devin S. Schindler, Note, The
Class-Based Animus Requirement of 42 US.C. § 1985(3): A Limiting Strategy
Gone Awry?, 83 MICH. L. REV. 88, 92-102 (1985); Gormley, supra note 3, at 575-
77.
187. See Scott, 463 U.S. at 836-38; Wilhelm, 720 F.2d at 1176.
188. See, e.g., Lake, 112 F.3d at 687; Rodgers v. Lincoln Towing Serv., Inc.,
771 F.2d 194, 203 (7th Cir. 1985); Browder v. Tipton, 630 F.2d 1149, 1150 (6th
Cir. 1980); Trautz, 819 F. Supp. at 291. See generally, Gormley, supra note 3, at
575 (arguing for the use of the discrete and insular minority test).
189. See, e.g., Lake, 112 F.3d at 687; Novotny, 584 F.2d at 1243, rev'don other
grounds, 442 U.S. 366 (1979); Diulus v. Churchill Valley Country Club, 601 F.
Supp. 677, 681 (W.D. Pa. 1985); Santigo v. City of Philadelphia, 435 F. Supp. 136,
156 (E.D. Pa. 1977). See generally, Schindler, supra note 186, at 95-98; Class-
Based Animus, supra note 2, at 650-5 1.
190. See, e.g., Browder, 630 F.2d at 1150; Kenyatta v. Moore, 623 F. Supp. 224,
230 (S.D. Miss. 1985).
191. See, e.g., Cameron v. Brock, 473 F.2d 608, 610 (6th Cir. 1973); Bricker v.
Crane 468 F.2d 1228, 1233 (1st Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 930 (1973); Azar
v. Conley 456 F.2d 1382, 1386 n.5 (6th Cir. 1972); Scott v. Moore, 461 F. Supp.
224 (E.D. Tex. 1978). See generally, Schindler, supra note 186, at 92-95; Class-
Based Animus, supra note 2, at 646-47.
192. See, e.g., 3 JOSEPH G. COOK & JOHN L. SOBIESKI, JR., CIVIL RIGHTS
ACTIONS § 13.09[A] (1997); 2 RODNEY A. SMOLLA, FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ACTS
§ 15.04[4] (3d ed. 1994).
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C. Class Confusion in Lake
The Third Circuit's decision in Lake clearly was tainted with this
class confusion. The Third Circuit described the issue as "a question of
first impression, whether a plaintiff's status as a mentally retarded fe-
male places her within a cognizable class entitled to protection under
[§ 1985(3)].' The case is an appeal from the district court's dismissal,
which was based on the finding that "Elizabeth Lake's membership in
the class of handicapped individuals did not entitle her to the protection
afforded by section 1985(3).' 194 With the issue couched in this manner,
the court, looking solely to the plaintiffs membership in a class, com-
pletely failed to focus on and analyze whether the defendant's intent was
invidiously discriminatory. The Third Circuit discussed in detail the
characteristics of the handicapped as a class; that a disability is an "im-
mutable characteristic,"' 95 that the disabled are a "discrete and insular
minority,"' 196 and that the disabled have suffered a "history of discrimi-
nation." 197 All of these considerations factored into the decision that the
handicapped could qualify for protection under § 1985(3). It is ironic
that the class-based animus, which theoretically constitutes part of the
secohd element listed in Griffin, that is purposely depriving another of
the equal protection of the laws, 19 8 was determined without any exami-
nation of the defendant's actions. This irony is typical of the confusion
in § 1985(3) jurisprudence caused by the mistaken shift in analysis from
the defendant's intent to the plaintiff s class.
199
D. An End to Class Confusion: A Proposal
Ending the confusion about the class-based animus issue does not
involve changing the Griffin requirement of a "class-based, invidiously
discriminatory animus," but rather involves changing the analysis of that
language in two essential ways. The invidious discriminatory intent of
the conspirators should be considered more vigorously and the class-
based aspect of the conspirators' animus should be deemphasized.
193. Lake, 112 F.3d at 684 (footnote omitted, emphasis added).
194. Id. at 685 (emphasis added).
195. Id at 687.
196. Id. (quoting the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7)).
197. Id. at 688 (quoting the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §
12101(a)(7)).
198. See Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 97-98 (1971).
199. See, e.g., id. at 102.
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1. More Focus on Discriminatory Intent
Essentially, the second half of the Griffin language should be applied
first. A court faced with a § 1985(3) complaint should initially scrutinize
the conspirators' actions to determine the presence of invidious dis-
crimination. While this may seem like an extraordinarily difficult
threshold inquiry for busy district courts to make, several sources could
aid their analysis.
The Supreme Court in Bray adopted a standard for discriminatory
purpose from equal protection jurisprudence. "'Discriminatory purpose'
•.. implies more than intent as volition or intent as awareness of conse-
quences. It implies that the decision maker ... selected or reaffirmed a
particular course of action at least in part 'because of not merely 'in
spite of,' its adverse effects upon an identifiable group., 200 As long as
the discrimination was against a known class, and as long as the bias
was "because of' class membership, then a requisite invidiously dis-
criminatory animus would be present.
Furthermore, Bray implied that this discriminatory intent must be so
invidious as to almost rise to the level of racism. 20 1 Thus, an invidiously
discriminatory animus will be found when a defendant's conduct is jus-
tifiably associated with the ugliness of racism.
20 2
Tempted by a desire to make this rather nebulous standard more defi-
nite, one might propose that a specific intent requirement replace the
class-based animus requirement of § 1985(3). The statute's criminal
counterpart, 18 U.S.C. § 241,203 has been interpreted to require such a
200. Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 271-72 (quoting
Personnel Adm'n of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256,279 (1979)) (emphasis added).
201. Id at 274. The Court observed that "the nature of the 'invidiously dis-
criminatory animus' Griffin had in mind is suggested both by the language used in
that phrase ... and by the company in which the phrase is found." Id. (internal
citations omitted).
202. For an explanation of another court applying this type of "akin to racism"
analysis, see, for example, Cartolano v. Tyrell, 421 F. Supp. 526, 532 (N.D. Ill.
1976). "The 'class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus' referred to in Griffin
relates to that kind of irrational and odious class discrimination akin to racial bias -
such as discrimination based on national origin or religion." Id. (quoting Arnold v.
Tiffany, 329 F. Supp. 1034, 1036 (C.D. Cal.), affd, 487 F.2d 216 (9th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 415 U.S. 984 (1974)).
203. It is a felony if "two or more persons conspire to injure, oppress, threaten,
or intimidate any inhabitant of any State, Territory, or District in the free exercise
or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by the Constitution or laws of
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"specific intent to interfere with [another's] federal rights." 204 However,
the Griffin Court explicitly rejected any specific intent requirement for
§ 1985(3). o5 Griffin made it clear that since "§ 1985(3), unlike § 242 [or
§ 241], contains no specific requirement of 'willfulness,' . . . [t]he moti-
vation aspect of § 1985(3) focuses not on scienter in relation to depriva-
tion of rights but on invidiously discriminatory animus. ' ,206 This strong
language would also seem to reject the Court's prior interpretation in
Snowden v. Hughes,20 7 which required a showing of "purposeful dis-
crimination." Interestingly though, the Snowden language was not ex-
pressly overruled by Griffin; rather, "purposeful discrimination" was
simply not applied to § 1985(3).
2. Reduced Focus on Class
While the second part of the Griffin language is applied first, the first
part should be applied second, and applied in an extremely broad man-
ner. Any class which is readily and easily definable 208 should be allowed
to qualify for the "class-based" requirement of Griffin. This minimal
requirement of class membership should be retained, and not discarded
completely, because the Klan violence discriminated against individuals
based on such membership in various groups, including blacks, union
sympathizers, and Republicans. However, picking and choosing which
classes qualify limits the protection given by § 1985(3) solely and un-
justifiably on the basis of artificial factors.
This deferential view that nearly all classes should receive § 1985(3)
protection has been suggested by several scholars20 9 and courts210 for
the United States." 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1994).
204. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 753-54 (1966).
205. Griffin, 403 U.S. at 102 n.10; see also Azar v. Conley, 456 F.2d 1382,
1386 (6th Cir. 1972) (pointing out the Griffin Court's reliance on Monroe v. Pape,
365 U.S. 167 (1961)).
206. Griffin, 403 U.S. at 102 n.10.
207. 321 U.S. 1(1944).
208. A group should not be considered readily and easily definable unless it can
satisfy the minimum class requirements expressed by Justice Scalia in Bray, that
the group be "something more than a group of individuals who share a desire to
engage in conduct that the § 1985(3) defendant disfavors .... [that] the class 'can-
not be defined simply as the group of victims of the tortious action."' Bray, 506
U.S. 269 (quoting Scott, 463 U.S. at 850 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)).
209. See McDonald, supra note 3, at 511.
210. Azar v. Conley, 456 F.2d 1382, 1386 n.5 (6th Cir. 1972) (dicta); see also
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many reasons. The language of § 1985(3) itself instructs that the con-
spiracy can be aimed at "any person or class of persons., 211 These words
do not indicate any limitation on what classes qualify for its protection.
To impose such a limitation would contradict the Court's instruction in
Griffin to "accord [civil rights statutes] a sweep as broad as [their] lan-
guage." 212 Furthermore, other Reconstruction civil rights statutes and
amendments, which likewise do not mention which classes are pro-
tected, such as the Fourteenth Amendment, are no longer held to protect
merely their originally intended beneficiaries. Thus, it is unjustifiable to
continue to limit § 1985(3)'s classes in such a way.
Allowing almost any class to qualify for § 1985(3) protection would
seem to run contrary to the argument advanced in Scott, that § 1985(3)
was intended to protect only blacks in the Reconstruction South and its
protection should not extend beyond racial bias. However, Scott's inter-
pretation of legislative history is unpersuasive as compared to Justice
Blackmun's dissent in that case which read the motivations of the Forty-
Second Congress quite differently. The dissent determined that Con-
gress' true hope in enacting § 1985(3) was to provide some protection
for those who were not receiving equal protection from local law en-
forcement authorities because of their beliefs or associations. 213 Other
critics of the Scott majority opinion have also noted both that Congress'
concern in enacting § 1985(3) was not solely racial 214 and that the scant
historical analysis contained in the opinion hardly justifies making such
a broad assertion. 21 5 Hence, the class-based animus should not be limited
to race solely premised on Scott's interpretation of the Reconstruction.
Scott, 463 U.S. at 853 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
211. See the language of § 1985(3), supra note 4.
212. Griffin, 403 U.S. at 97 (quoting United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 801
(1966)).
213. Scott, 463 U.S. at 853 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun argued
that:
Congress intended to provide a remedy to any class of persons,
whose beliefs or associations placed them in danger of not receiving
equal protection of the laws from local authorities. While certain
class traits, such as race, religion, sex, and national origin, per se
meet this requirement, other traits also may implicate the functional
concerns in particular situations.
Id.
214. See Shatz, supra note 58, at 929-31 (arguing that the Ku Klux Klan Act, if
it had any primary intended beneficiary, was meant to protect Republicans in the
Reconstruction South); McDonald, supra note 3, at 475-92.
215. Shatz, supra note 58, at 924.
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The legislative history of the Ku Klux Klan Act further supports the
supposition that all classes were intended to be protected from discrimi-
natory conspiracies. During debate on § 1985(3), one senator who pro-
claimed that a conspiracy would be actionable if "it should appear that
[the] conspiracy was formed against [a] man because he was a Demo-
crat, if you please, or because he was a Catholic, or because he was a
Methodist, or because he was a Vermonter .... "216 Representative
Buckley asserted that § 1985(3) "is not to protect Republicans only in
their property, liberties, and lives, but Democrats as well, not the col-
ored only, but the whites also; yes, even women and children . ... "217
Representative Harris pointed out that "[t]here is one good feature in
this bill; that is, it applies to all.",2t8 Their comments support the view
that the original drafters of § 1985(3) did not conceive of our present
situation in which some classes are receiving protection under § 1985(3)
and others are not.
3. Class-Based Animus Still a Limit on § 1985(3) Actions
Determining class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus in this
proposed way would still achieve the main goal of limiting § 1985(3)
claims, namely to maintain the balance of federalism. The strict appli-
cation of the initial determination of invidious discrimination alone can
adequately restrain the number of § 1985(3) claims. For example, the
application of this discrimination analysis to the limited facts known of
the Lake case could have led to the dismissal of the § 1985(3) claim.
There, the actions of Elizabeth Lake's parents and the other defendants,
although reprehensible in many ways, may have stemmed from a con-
cern for her health and welfare. Their actions would have to be devel-
oped more fully to make an accurate determination, but they hardly
seem akin to racism. As Justice Scalia might say, the actions of Eliza-
beth Lake's parents are simply "not the stuff out of which a § 1985(3)
'invidiously discriminatory animus' is created.,, 219 The limiting effect of
the discrimination element alone is evident.
216. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 567 (1871) (statement of Sen. Ed-
munds).
217. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. App. 190 (1871) (statement of Rep.
Buckley).
218. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 484 (1871) (statement of Rep. Harris).
219. Bray, 506 U.S. at 274.
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III. RIGHTS PROTECTED BY § 1985(3)
Section 1985(3) prohibits "depriving, either directly or indirectly, any
person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws." 220 Yet,
this language is not elucidating. The question remains: what "equal
protections" are covered by § 1985(3)?
It is important to acknowledge that this analysis presumes that
§ 1985(3) does not create independent civil rights, but rather is remedial
in nature, defending those civil rights, privileges, and immunities
granted elsewhere.
The view of the purely remedial nature of § 1985(3) was first recog-
nized by the Supreme Court in Novotny
2 2
1 and was reaffirmed in Scott.
222
The remedial nature of § 1985(3) has been criticized by some
scholars.223 However, such criticism is unpersuasive. Admittedly, the
Forty-Second Congress created a new cause of action by enacting
§ 1985(3), but this legislation was designed to be corrective and protec-
tive of the other new rights created by the Reconstruction-era Con-
gresses. 224 This remedial nature is most clearly evidenced by the name
given to the Ku Klux Klan Act when first introduced to the House; it
declared to be a bill "to enforce the provisions of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution and for other purposes. 225 Hence,
§ 1985(3) is rightly understood as a purely remedial statute.
A. The Rights are Vindicated by § 1985(3)
Since § 1985(3) does vindicate "rights found elsewhere," as shown
above, the remaining issue is which rights. This issue was answered in
220. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1994). See supra note 4 and accompying text.
221. See Great American Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366,
372 (1979) ("Section 1985(3) provides no substantive rights itself; it merely pro-
vides a remedy for violation of the rights its designates.").
222. See Scott, 463 U.S. at 833 (quoting Great American Fed. Sav. & Loan
Ass'n v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366, 372 (1979)).
223. See Helyn S. Goldstein, Note, Private Conspiracies to Violate Civil Rights:
The Scope of Section 1985(3) After Great American Federal Savings & Loan Asso-
ciation v. Novotny, 61 B.U. L. REv. 1007, 1019-1021 (1981) (arguing that
§ 1985(3) has a hybrid, remedial and substantial nature). It should be noted that
this Note was written prior to the decision in Scott.
224. See Gressman, supra note 3, at 1334.
225. Id.
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the Scott decision226 and was reaffirmed in Bray.227
The extent of the rights actionable under § 1985(3) seems to depend
on whether the conspirators may be considered state actors in some
sense. This dependence stems from the distinction between those rights
secured against governmental interference and those rights which are
also protected against private interference. 2 8 If, among the conspirators,
some person or organization could be deemed a state agent or if state
action can be found, then the whole gambit of constitutional rights may
be vindicated by § 1985(3).229 However, if the conspiracy is solely pri-
vate, then § 1985(3) vindicates only those rights "protected against pri-
vate, as well as official, encroachment.
230
A list of those rights guaranteed against private impairment is admit-
tedly brief.23 1 In Bray, Justice Scalia listed the Thirteenth Amendment
right to be free from involuntary servitude232 and the right to interstate
travel.233 However, this list could also include the right to vote,3 the
226. See Scott, 463 U.S. at 833.
227. See Bray, 506 U.S. at 274.
228. Compare, for example, U.S. CONST. AMEND. 1, XIV with U.S. CONST.
AMEND XIII.
229. See United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787 (1966). In Price, the Supreme
Court construed the criminal counterpart of § 1985(3), 18 U.S.C. § 241, which does
not explicitly require any state action for a conspiracy depriving rights for a felony
violation. Id. at 801. Since § 241 conspiracies could be completely private, the
Court had previously held that the statute did not extend to protect Fourteenth
Amendment rights, which protect solely against governmental action. Id at 796-
97. But, in Price, state actors were active participants in the conspiracy in ques-
tion. Id at 799. Thus, the protections of § 241 were extended, where there was
state involvement, to include those rights which secure against governmental action
as well. Id. The state involvement brought "the conspiracy within the ambit of the
Fourteenth Amendment." Id. In the same way, if one of the § 1985(3) conspirators
could be deemed a state actor, then the conspiracy as a whole could also deprive
another of their rights which are guaranteed against governmental infringement as
well.
230. Scott, 463 U.S. at 833; see also Bray, 506 U.S. at 274.
231. See United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 771 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissent-
ing). "It is true that there is a very narrow range of rights against individuals which
have been read into the Constitution." Id.; see also Twining v. New Jersey, 211
U.S. 78 (1908).
232. Bray, 506 U.S. at 278 (citing United States v. Kozminiski, 487 U.S. 931,
942 (1988)).
233. See id. at 278 (citing United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 759 n.17
(1966)).
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right not to be injured while in the custody of a United States
Marshall, 235 the right to inform federal officials of violations of federal
law,236 and the right to assemble to petition the Congress for a redress of
grievances.
237
This limited number of rights protected from infringement by a pri-
vate conspiracy under § 1985(3) has received much criticism. The main
thrust of this argument has been that such a limited protection of rights
238under § 1985(3) goes against congressional' intent. The basic conten-
tion is that the drafters of § 1985(3) believed that the protection offered
by the statute would reach private conspiracies to deprive civil rights
regardless of whether those rights were secured against private or gov-
ernmental infringement. 239 The belief of the 1871 drafters depended on
the theory that "the right of equal protection of the law as well as other
rights were rights of national citizenship guaranteed directly to the peo-
ple. They existed independently of any state action."
240
However, this argument is flawed. The drafters who crafted the Ku
Klux Klan Act in 1871 viewed their constitutional powers in a manner
which is presently not acceptable. As Justice Blackmun's comments
above illustrate, the Congresses of the Reconstruction era viewed their
powers under the newly enacted Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth
Amendments as broad, expansive powers. In their opinion, the federal
government's new powers encompassed areas which the Southern states
were neglecting. One area of particular neglect was securing civil rights
for individuals. 241 It is particularly telling that § 1985(3) was enacted in
1871, five years before the Supreme Court, in United States v. Cruik-
shank2 42 held that the Civil War amendments applied only to the states
and not to private misconduct. 243 The 1871 Congress' federally domi-
nated view of federalism, however, has not withstood the scrutiny of the
234. See Exparte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651 (1884); see also Reynolds v. Sims,
377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964); id. at 554 (listing various other private rights associated
with voting).
235. See Logan v. United States, 114 U.S. 263 (1892).
236. See In re Quarles, 158 U.S. 532, 537-38 (1895).
237. See also United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 552 (1875) (dicta).
238. See Gormley, supra note 3, at 540.
239. See Scott, 463 U.S. at 846 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
240. Id. at 843 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
241. See Gressman, supra note 3, at 1329-36.
242. 92 U.S. 542 (1876).
243. Id. at 554-55.
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Supreme Court. The Court, during and after the Reconstruction, consis-
tently held that the states are primarily responsible for ensuring the
rights of their citizens.244 Admittedly, the creators of § 1985(3) likely
hoped that the statute would extend protection beyond the narrow scope
it is given today, but this hope resulted from their misconception re-
garding the actual extent of their powers. To presently give § 1985(3)
the scope its drafters thought it had, simply because they thought so,
would require a massive break from precedent and reformulation of the
balance of federalism.
B. Rights Vindicated in Lake
In Lake, Elizabeth Lake alleged that the defendants' conspiracy de-
prived her of the "fundamental right to procreation" and as such she
should be able to recover under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3).245 The source of
this fundamental right is never elaborated upon and the court cites no
legal precedent to justify the existence of such a right. The only expla-
nation comes in a footnote, which specifies that the procreative right
comes from the Constitution, not the Americans with Disabilities Act.246
One is left to assume that this right to procreation is derived from an
implied constitutional right of privacy.247 If this assumption is correct,
then this procreative right should be analyzed much like the right to
abortion in Bray.248 There, Justice Scalia clearly held that the right to an
abortion, and the more general right to privacy, are not among the rights
secured against private infringement, and thus not protected under §
1985(3). Hence, the Third Circuit erred in allowing this right to pro-
244. See Gormley, supra note 3, at 541-46. See generally, Gressman, supra
note 3, at 1337-43.
The legislative program of the post-Civil War days was premised on
the belief that the fundamental rights of the individual should be de-
fined and enforced by the federal government. But the Supreme
Court has consistently refused to accept that premise. It has substi-
tuted its belief that civil rights lie within the realm of state power
and that any federal attempt to encroach on that power is to be
viewed narrowly and suspiciously. The Court has expressed its be-
lief so many times that it would necessitate a judicialand constitu-
tional upheaval of the first magnitude to undo what the Court has
done.
Gressman, supra note 3, at 1357.
245. See Lake, 112 F.3d at 685.
246. Id. at 688 n.10.
247. See generally Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
248. See Bray, 506 U.S. at 276.
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creation to be protected under § 1985(3).
However, before this assessment of error is made final, another possi-
bility should be considered. The court explicitly declined to rule on
whether Tyrone Hospital could be deemed a state actor for the purposes
of § 1985(3).249 As seen above, if the conspiracy does not solely consist
of private actors, but has some state actors, then § 1985(3) can vindicate
rights guaranteed against public as well as private infringement.25°
Therefore, the plaintiffs in Lake could properly recover under § 1985(3)
if Tyrone Hospital were later found through more extensive fact finding
to be a state actor.
C. An Apology for the Narrow Scope
A natural reaction to limiting the coverage of a civil rights statute is a
feeling of anxiety. Will such a narrow scope leave some groups de-
fenseless? By curbing the stretch of the statute, are we allowing dis-
crimination to run rampant? These worries are inappropriate in reference
to the analysis of § 1985(3) proposed in this Note.
Section 1985(3) actions reach solely the narrow group of rights se-
cured against private infringement only in those situations where no
state action can be found in the conspiracy. 25' However, with the state
action doctrine interpreted broadly, 252 this would rarely be the case. In
most cases, state action will be present. Thus, in most instances, the
whole gambit of constitutional rights will be available for vindication
under § 1985(3).
Furthermore, § 1985(3) actions will rarely be a plaintiffs only option
for redress. In the Lake decision, Elizabeth Lake brought several claims
against the defendants, including a claim under § 1983, as well as sev-
eral state claims. 253 This is typical of the other cases discussed above.
Hence, a narrow reading is not troubling because one of the many weap-
249. See Lake, 112 F.2d at 689.
250. See Scott, 463 U.S. at 833.
251. See id.
252. See Martin Dolan, Comment, State Inaction and Section 1985(3): United
Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of America v. Scott, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1271,
1280 (1986) (interpreting Shelly v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), to "represent the
possibility that virtually all societal activities could be regarded as state action.");
Guest, 383 U.S. at 755 ("In a variety of situations the Court has found state action
of a nature sufficient to create rights under the Equal Protection Clause even
though the participation of the State was peripheral.").
253. See Lake, 112 F.2d at 684.
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ons in the arsenal of legal devices against discrimination has a smaller
bang than the others.
The narrow scope of rights vindicated under § 1985(3) should be ap-
preciated as another means to prevent the use of the statute as a general
federal tort law. As discussed in the Griffin decision and above, there
would be serious constitutional problems with federalizing what would
otherwise be state tort actions.25 4 Thus, the limited scope of rights pro-
tected under § 1985(3) has the kinder, gentler benefit of maintaining the
traditional balance of state and federal powers.
IV. CONCLUSION
The issue of whether disabled individuals can recover under § 1985(3)
has almost become lost in the discussion of the statute's coverage and
scope. Clearing away some of the confusion surrounding the Ku Klux
Klan Act is necessary for a precise, accurate view of § 1985(3). The
confusion was caused by three sources: (1) the lack of Supreme Court
guidance; (2) the mistaken shift of focus from the defendant's intent to
the plaintiffs class membership; and, (3) the mistaken views of the Re-
construction Congress. By brushing aside this confusion and by recog-
nizing the misleading influences at work in Lake, it becomes clear that
disabled individuals and all other readily definable classes can recover
under § 1985(3) for private conspiracies to deprive them of those rights
guaranteed against private infringement.
Matthew C. Hans
254. See supra note 167, and accompanying text.
